"THE LAW" AND THE LAW OF CHANGE.
A TENTATIVE

STUDY IN COMPARATIVE JURISPRUDENCE.

THE CYCLES OF LEGAL HISTORY.

"A general proposition of some value," says Sir Henry
Maine, "may be advanced with respect to the agencies by which
law is brought into harmony with society. These instrumentalities seem to me to be three in number, legal fictions, equity
and legislation. Their historical order is that in which I have
placed them. Sometimes two of them will be seen operating
together and there are legal systems which have escaped the
influence of one or other of them. But I know of no instance in
which the order of their appearance has been changed or inverted." 1
In explaining these terms, Maine draws occasional illustrations from English legal history which had not been worked out
in his day and frequent illustrations from Roman law between
the two codes-the Twelve Tables and the Code of Justinian.
Of his use of Roman law he says:
"Much of the inquiry attempted could not have been prosecuted with the slightest hope of a useful result if there had not
existed a body of law like that of the Romans bearing in its earlier
portions the traces of the most remote antiquity and supplying from
its later rules the staple of the civil institutions by which modern
society is even now controlled."
It is submitted that the history of Jewish law furnishes another example that could have been used, one with a longer continuous development than even that of the Roman law-so much
longer that by its study we are enabled to assign to Maine's three
agencies their proper positions as mere arcs in a cycle, a constantly recurring cycle-of which Maine says nothing. In fact,
his explanations suggest that a society that has passed from the
stage of custom into that of law uses one instrumentality until
the next comes into being; that when the cruder instrumentality
finally gives p!ace to the more perfect one, the functions of the
cruder have been exhausted for that society. The same general
1'aine,

Ancient Law, Chap.

2.
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observation is true of the several modifications of Maine's theory
that have appeared from time to time; I shall refer in passing to
two of them. Jenks would trace at least all Germanic systems
from caste to contract through certain progressive stages. Dean
Roscoe Pound, again, speaks of the stage of primitive law as
followed by strict law, equity, maturity of law and some fifth
stage upon which Europe and America are now simultaneously
entering. A closer inspection of Pound's stages will reveal that
they represent swings of the pendulum back and forth between
It is submitted, however, that the
strict law and equity. 2
periods of strict law and equity are composite and that the same
component parts are discernible in each recurrence, that a selfrepeating cycle is the result, and that Sir Henry Maine's observation has happily hit upon the main features of this cycle.
We need only write both at the bdginning and at the end of
his list "codification"-by which we understand a crystallization
of law into hard and fast rules definitely stated, to make the
self-repeating cycle: codification, fictions, equity, legislation,
codification, fictions, equity, legislation, and so on. 3
This cycle, subject to a few explanations' which follow, it
seems, fairly represents the characteristic trends in all legal histories that have so far been explored and mapped out for us.
A code is given to a people or made by them-it makes little
difference. They begin by studying the text, and no expansion
is possible at first unless consistent with the text. At least new
ideas must square outwardly with the words of the text. If they
cannot be squared in fact they can perhaps by resort to fictions.
The word "fictions" here even in the comprehensive sense in
which Maine uses it is too narrow. To him the expression "legal
fiction" signifies "any assumption which conceals or affects to
'I have before me the recent restatement of his theory in The American

Bar Association Journal, Vol. 3, PP. 58-64, January, 1917.
'No account is given here of the stage known as primitive law. Its
characteristics are discussed by the writers mentioned above and by many
others. Whatever may be true of it I do not admit that it is the only stage
in which religion and law are united. Jewish, Mohammedan and Hindu
law have never been divorced from religion, and even modern European law
has become isolated from religion only gradually and incompletely. One
would hardly call English law primitive up to 1857.
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conceal the fact that a rule of law has undergone alteration, its
letter remaining unchanged, its operation being modified." And
this kind of fiction he connects with primitive society and its superstitions. The making of legal fictions, however, is but one manifestation of what I may call literalism. It is the attempt to do
the most with the words before you. It is not so much the child
of the perversity of the legal mind or the superstition of primitive man as the outgrowth of practical needs that may show
themselves in a very concrete way in a highly civilized society as
well as in a primitive community. Bound by a code, lawyers
become word-students whose work is marked by the elevation
of the letter above the spirit, a regard for the jots and tittles of
the law, a point of view that we may call "glossatorial." To
make the words fit life they may be interpreted artificially as
meaning something that they obviously did not mean originally.
Again, undue weight may be given to a peculiar turn of a phrase
which may have acquired a new meaning in the course of time,
and finally resort may be had to methods of doing things technlically, though not actually, in order to satisfy the law. Let us
call the period of fictions then the period of literalism or the
period of the glossators, or word-students.
Long before this period ends, if it ever does end, the second
and third points of view may appear-in fact, schools may exist
side by side and quarrel for many generations over the relative
merits of literalism and equity, but finally we see equity prevailing
and a second period in the modification of laws is ushered in.
Here, too, I wish to call attention to the fact that the designating
word "equity" represents but one manifestation of a whole point
of view, a point of view that historically follows the glossatorial.
It is the point of view of the student whom I shall call, for want
of a better word, the commentator, as distinguished from the
glossator. It is a point of view that is concerned with the subject
matter rather than the words, with the purposes of the law rather
than its method, its spirit rather than its letter, its principles
rather than its rules. It is an appeal from the text to common
sense, from technical rules to fundamental principles. Maine
suggests that:
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"The very conception of a set of principles, invested with a
higher sacredness than those of the original law and demanding
application independently of the consent of any external body [for
such consent would constitute legislation] belongs to a much more
advanced stage of thought than that to which legal fictions originally
suggested themselves."
But the chasm between the two positions is bridged when
we consider that the equity stage of the exaltation of general
principles may come gradually through a mode of study of the
older law whereby principles are first discovered in the growing
mass of rules. Glossation itself may be reduced to principles as
a first step. More general principles will follow. They may be
very indefinite-they may be summarized in such catch-words as
"conscience," or in some vague yet potent theory of a word of
God or a law of nature, or in a peculiar attitude that invests
general practice with legal force; but when principles are discovered and stated they will, it seems, be readily exalted above
the mere words, perhaps at first with the aid of such harmless
fictions as the omniprescience of the law-makers. The desire to
breathe the freer air of general principles comes to all peoples
who have suffered from the choking atmosphere of too many
particular rules. That desire is natural. The mode in which it
is satisfied and the extent to which it can be satisfied are of course
largely accidental, and will differ in different times and places.
So far as the growth comes through the administration of courts,
it is proper to call this period of growth the period of equity. So
far as it comes through the work of students and writers, we
may call it the period of the commentators, or principle-students.
The possibilities of growth by glossation and commentation, by fiction and -equity, are exceedingly great-far greater
than the layman would suppose-but there is a limit to what can
be done with an old code. When the breaking point is reached,
additions and modifications are generally made by legislation.
Here again I must warn against too narrow a use of the word.
The kind of change that we are now considering is not necessarily connected with a legislature. It may be conscious or unconscious. Maine suggests that legislation necessarily derives
its authority from an external body or person. But I prefer to
use the term with especial reference to the fact that in this kind
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of law obligatory force is independent of general principles. It
may be judicial legislation parading under a thin disguise. It
may simply be the tacit recognition of new customs. The point
is, it is the enforcement of rules alongside of the old code without the pretense that they are to be found in the old code. And
when a code becomes overburdened with new matter of this kind,
what is more natural than the adoption of a new code?
We must distinguish here between a code and practice books
such as the abridgement (a selection) which is apt to appear in a
glossatorial period, the sumna (a summary) which is apt
to appear before, and the digest (an analytical compilation) of
decisions which is apt to appear after a commentatorial period.
These may serve as preparatory works for the codifier. Indeed,
the digest may be a pandect, an all-container, and eventually may
become a code. But in themselves these books are not codes.4
The distinguishing mark of the code is that a people accepts itprobably very gradually-as the correct, authoritative statement
of its corpus juris. When this stage is reached, we are ready for
another revolution of the cycle. In other words: every "Moses,"
every codifier, is followed by a "Joshua," a faithful disciple who
departeth not out of the tabernacle, and "elders" who expound,
by "prophets" who expand and by an "assembly" which makes a
"hedge around the law," or some other kind of statutes and
finally codifies again.5 Or more technically the sequence may be
illustrated in a table:
Codification
Glossation
(word-study and fiction)
Commentation
(principle-study and equity)
Legislation
Codification
'Many Jewish works of this nature are popularly called codes (cf. Jewish Encylclopedia, "s. v. Codification of Law), but their failuk'e to be generally
adopted precludes them from the concept as used here. Thus Alfasi's sole
object was to make an "abridgement"; that of Maimonides, the philosopher,

was to "summarize"; that of Asher ben Jehiel and his son Jacob ben Asher
was to "digest" the innovations of their time. See below.
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Before attempting to review Jewish experience under the
"Law" in the light of this theory it may be well to illustrate the
theory itself by the merest suggestion of its applicability to the
two leading systems of law current in Europe and America today
Roman-continental system and the Anglo-American
-the
system.
A. Roniut-ContinentalLaw.
Roman law between the Twelve Tables, its first great code,
and the famous code or culmination of attempted codes that bear
the name of Justinian, represents a perfect cycle, the cycle on
which Maine bases his observation. This period sees the strict
law and fictions of the Republic, the equity of the praetors and,
finally, the legislation of the later emperors. Between Justinian
at one end and the series of nineteenth-century codifications of
continental Europe from the Code Napoleon to the Biirgerliches
Gesetzbuch at the other, a second cycle is discernible. The first
post-Justinian jurists were glossators-uncritical acceptors of
the text till the rise of the school at Bologna; critical thereafter,
but glossators nevertheless. Their work ended with the great
glossator, Accursius. His followers were the commentators or
Bar.tolists, whose chief work was to adapt the Roman law to the
local and temporal conditions in which they found themselves.
The sum total of several centuries of this kind of work was the
making of a series of national legal systems based on custom
with Roman law as the mere background, first as Roman law, then
as natural law. At least we can approach the meeting point of
Roman law and the Leges Barbarorum from this angle without
There comes a time in
riding "an academic theory to death."
'Cf. the opening sentence of the Mishnah Tractate. 'Abhcth: "Moses
received the Torah on Sinai, and handed it down to Joshua; Joshua to the
Elders; the Elders to the Prophets; and the Prophets handed it down to the
men of the Great Assembly. They said: '. . . Make a hedge around the
Torah.'"
The other approach, through the "Barbarian Laws," is in current German writings the more popular. It is reflected in England in Jenks, Law and

Politics in the Middle Ages.
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each country when the national element speaks through legislation and finally comes codification hastened in some countries by
Napoleon, retarded in Germany by Savigny and his school.
Modern continental lawyers with their codes in their hands are
essentially glossators.
B. Anglo-American Law.
The history of Anglo-American law is parallel.7 Two cycles
are discernible with the year I29O in the reign of Edward I, the
English Justinian, as the turning point. The code or crystallization was the series of writs into which one's case had to fit or
perish. The last futile efforts to extend the list had been made
in the early years of Edward's reign through a series of famous
statutes. For one hundred years before Edward's day the method.
of making the law grow was by deliberately making new writs
for new cases on the basis of a general principle: no wrong without a remedy. We may call this without undue violence a period
of growth by equity.8 Still earlier and back to the Norman Conquest in spite of a strong pretense of the Norman kings to give
back the laws of Edward the Confessor, that is the Anglo-Saxon
crystallized customs, there were constantly being introduced reforms on the basis of fictions-especially the fiction that the
king's peace was invaded in all cases of interference with possession. Since 1290 a shower of handbooks of the law, and the
early Year Books show the lawyers grappling with word-problems in the writs and using fictions to make the law applicable.
"Damnum absque injuria" delights the technical judges of the
Year Books. Soon equity came on the scene. Passing by its early
beginnings in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries we find it the
'The cycles in Anglo-American law are fully worked out in the Introduction to the author's forthcoming book of Select Cases and Documents Illustrative of Anglo-American Legal History.
a Jenks has noticed the puzzling fact-puzzling unless two cycles are recognized in English legal history-that "there is, in fact, a greater resemblance
between the register of writs and the praetor's edict, with its list of formulae,
than between the edict and the vague processes of the-early days of equity.",
3o Harv. L. Rev. 16 (Nov. 1916). In view of this very just observation, I
regret that I am unable to follow Dean Pound in his description of the whole
period between the Norman Conquest and the equity of the chancellors as a

period of "strict law."
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chief instrumentality in the development of the administration of
justice in the 1500's and i6oo's. The i7oo's show it in the
process of hardening and in i8oi, when Eldon comes into power,
it is so well defined that it has ceased to be useful as a means of
making new law. The i8oo's witness the application of the
third instrumentality, legislation. We have been deluged with it
in England and America and today we are seeking refuge in
codification. Many parts of our law are already codified. What
becomes of these codes? Will a new cycle begin? Perhaps the
best answer may be had by reference to a branch of law that was
the first to be codified in America-.-antedating the period of general codification for peculiar political reasons by a century or
more. I refer to constitutional law. The great constitutional
decisions of the last century are largely glossatorial. WVhat is
interstate commerce? What is a jury? What is the true meaning
and extent of the doctrine of habeas corpus? What is a postal
road? What is due process of law? What is meant by the impairment of the obligations of contracts? What is an ex post
facto law? What are the privileges and immunities of citizens?
The difficulties incident to the amendment of the constitution
have even driven us in recent times to the making of some new
fictions. One of the boldest fictions ever perpetrated was made
in 1844. 9 It is the wholly gratuitous presumption that all of the
members of a corporation are citizens of the state in which the
corporation was organized, invented solely to bring certain cases
-within the constitutional phrase, "between citizens of different
states." Has not the whole college of presidential electors become a mere fiction? In addition, the constitution has been submitted to stretching by the giving of a very liberal meaning to
certain limited terms-another variation of the use of fiction.
Thus in time it became inevitable that Congress should have some
control over trusts, over telegraphs, over white slavery, whether
commercialized or not; over food and drugs, over meat inspection, over the length of working days and innumerable other
subjects and all of these powers have been assumed and justified
'See Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Letson (i844), 2 How. (U. S.) 497; II L.
Ed. 353; cf. Harlan, J., in Blake v. McClung (I898), 172 U. S. 239, 259.
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by a single clause: "The Congress shall have power . . . to
regulate commerce- .
. among the several states." "I
I shall digress a moment to draw a further illustration from
the interpretation of the Constitution of the United States. It
will serve as a close-up picture of the first stages in the postmorten history of a code. First it will suggest the necessary
incompleteness of all codes even at the time of their writing, and
the manner of filling them out by drawing from "common law."
It was far from the minds of the draughtsmen of the constitution
to enact unwritten English law into the United States Constitution. Indeed, Jefferson, who was of one spirit with many of
them, advocated an act forbidding the citation of English cases.
At least two of the United States passed such acts. Nevertheless,
when courts were confronted with such questions as: what is
habeas corpus, what is a jury and so on, what could they do?
They had to fall back upon English decisions antedating the constitution-in other words, they had to read the common law into
the constitution. And this was right-for what else could have
been meant by such words, if not what the English law had defined them to be? If you adopt the language of a country, you
tacitly adopt its law. A study of the part that language plays
in the psychosis of a people would take me too far afield. I shall
only call attention to a few coincidences. If you draw a language map of the world you have a law map. The
countries speaking English-America, Canada, South Africa and
Australia-have essentially English law. The part of Canada where the French language is just dying out is witnessing
the simultaneous demise of French law. The countries of South
America that speak Spanish are governed by Spanish
codes. The countries that speak languages based on the Latin
have laws based on the Roman code. In mediaeval France the
line that divided the land where "oc" meant "yes" from the land
where "ouF" [oil] meant "yes" also separated the country of the
written law from the country of the oral custumals. Lastly, the
Pilgrim Fathers wanted to adopt the law of God from the Bible,
but before they knew it they had imported with such words as
.

'Article I, Sec. 8.
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sheriff, will, heir, chattels, county and a thousand others-the
English institutions that they had meant to avoid. The relation
between language and law is deep-rooted and wonderfully subtile.
But to return to our subject-to interpret a code written in any
language one must know the common law of the land whence the
language came. Reverting to our study of the periods in the
vicissitudes of a code, I may add that this common law is more
important in a glossat6rial period than in a commentatorial or
equity period, and that it gradually loses its force in a statutory
period.
JFwisH LAw.
We are now ready to apply these principles to Jewish law."
The first cycle, that which led to the completion of the Old Testament of the Bible, is not easy to approach. If modern scholarship
has removed the warning, "The place whereon thou standest is
holy ground," it has at the same time substituted another, "DanWithout attempting to date any "documents."
ger Zone." 12
In the transliterating of Hebrew the scheme used here is that which I
employ throughout the new International Standard Bible Encyclopedia. I
am also using the abbreviations of book names found in that work.
"It seems to me that Maine stopped short of using the Bible for illustrative purposes because of the first of these warnings. Mr. Oko, however.
to whom I wish to acknowledge my deep indebtedness for innumerable suggestions, is inclined to suspect him of having feared the second.
[That Maine in his Ancient Law should not have drawn illustrations for his
principle of legal development also from Biblical legislation, is more than passing strange. That he had more than a "bowing" acquaintance with Biblical
law may be inferred from his discussion of the primitive operation of Wills
(Ancient Law, 5th Ed., p. 197), and of the modern history of crimes (Ibid.,
p. 397). J. D. Michaelis' Mosaisches Recht (1770-75), a work not devoid of
merit, was accessible to Maine in an English translation under the title Commentaries on the Laws of Moses (4 Vols.; London, 1814), a title, as the
translator, Rev. A. Smith, explains, suggested by the analogy of this work
to that of Blackstone. It should also be noted that a decisive inroad of German theological scholarship into England had already been made three
decades before Ancient Law was first published (I861) : Milman's History
of the Jews appeared anonymously in 1829. The liberal dean insisted that
the Bible should be studied like any other historical book. Further, the text
of the Old Testament was much studied in England towards the middle of
the nineteenth century-witness the remarkable volume of Essays and Reviews (i86o), the work of Bishop Colenso on the Pentateuch, and that or
Dean Stanley. The trend of the times is likewise reflected in the appearance
(1862) of the anonymous translation of Spinoza's Tractatus TheologicoPoliticus by the London physician Robert Willis-a work, in which the composite nature of the Pentateuch was pointed out for the first time and in
which several results of modern Old Testament scholarship were anticipated
It is quite possible that Maine simply refrained from using freely the Biblical
knowledge of his day for secular learning for fear of being dragged into con-
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without participating in the controversies that are still the battleground of specialists, one may venture to survey the general legal
tendencies of Old Testament times. For after all the Biblical
codes, whenever and by whomever they wete reduced to writing,
are legal codes, subject in the hands of men to the ordinary vicissitudes of codes-a fact too generally overlooked by radical and
conservative alike. We must remember that as codes they are
incomplete statements of the law of a people, and that they are,
like the Constitution of the United States, based on a common
law, that they call for interpretation, and that through interpretation they grow."3
Biblical common law-the common law of the Hebrewsmay need a little elucidation. Let us take a few examples. Ift
the first place Biblical law provides for a refuge from the avenger
of blood. 14 Where does it tell what an avenger of blood
is? Nowhere. Everybody is presumed to know that part of the
common law-and it is not repealed, only mitigated. Again, no
mention is made in Biblical law of the rights of sons to inherit,
but assuming that everybody knows that principle, the Biblical
language '5 becomes clear. It provides rules of inheritance in
case a man die and have no son. More particularly the peculiar
rules of primogeniture of the Hebrews-the giving of a double
portion to the first-born-are nowhere laid down; they are pretroversy. We must remember that from i86o to 1864 English academical and
clerical obscurantism was much agitated by the publication of Essays and
Reviews, by the Colenso "heresy," and finally by the tremendous interest
aroused by Darwin's Origin of Species (i859). "Maine," Sir Frederick Pollock tells us, "was generally averse to controversy."-A. S. 0.]
' Since writing this paper I have been interested to learn that the "consuetudinary" laws presupposed in Biblical legislation were recognized by
Michaelis one hundred fifty years ago. (Commentaries on the Laws of
Moses, Book I, Art. III.) Michaelis uses two of the illustrations above and
adds that of divorce, which is checked, though nowhere specifically authorized. Its authorization is in the common law. (Dt. 22 19, 29; 24 1-4, AV and
RV are here misled by the paraphrase in Mt. 6 31, and Michaelis is right, cf.
Jew. Pub. Soc. translation; Jer. 3 1.) Michaelis fails to see in Jewish tradition an outgrowth of this "consuetudinary" law. Consequently some of the
conclusions he draws from his find differ radically from the present author's.
Michaelis' readiness to draw upon popular accounts of contemporary Arabic
culture for illustrations of the Bible contrasts strangely with his utter inability
to see the more obvious illustrations in Jewish history.
'Nu. 35 9-28; Dt. x9 I-IO.

Nu. 27 8-I.
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sumed to be known in the discussion of the illegality of the transferring of the birthright of the child of one wife to the
child of another.16 The levirate law is recited in the Biblical
codes,17 but more attention is paid to the ldliah, or the formula
for its evasion, than to the old custom itself.'
Now we find
traces of all of these institutions and many others in the stories
of .the patriarchs where they have all the earmarks of common
law or custom. There is the vendetta in the relations. between
the sons of Jacob and the men of Schechem. 19 Inheritance and
primogeniture run through the stories of the patriarchs. .The
levirate is illustrated in the story of Judah and Tamar.2 0 In
short, strange as it may seem to the layman, to the jurist there
is nothing remarkable in the Talmudic notion that before the
days of the written law, Abraham, the Hebrew, observed the
oral Torah, the common law of the Hebrews. 2 But we need nob
center our attention on the peculiar institutions of the Hebrews
to see the significance of their common law in the interpretation
of the Hebrew codes. Every Hebrew word, in even the simplest
of sentences, carries with it its bit of Hebrew common law. Basukkoth tishebh% - in booths shall ye dwell. 22 What is a
sukkah? How high may it be and still be a sukkah? How low?
Of What materials may it be made? How may it be covered?
What part of its wall space may be open without doing violence
to the denotation and the connotation of the term as understood
when and where the code was made? 23 The term had some
connotation at the outset-in other words, there was on these
-points a hdlakhah leMdsheh misSnai or, in English, a custom

from a time that the memory of man runneth not to the contrary. And the questions are legitimate, legal and logical in a
"Dt. 21 16, 17.
Dt. 25 5, 6.

Dt. 25 7-1o.
"

Cf. also Gen. 9 5.

0 Gen. 23.

2 See commentaries on Gen. 26 5, "because Abraham obeyed my voice,
and kept my charge, my commandments, my statutes, and my laws."
'Lev. 23 42.
2"Cf. Mishnah, Sukkdh I. i.
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glossatorial study. One source from which to draw the answers
would be the opinion of persons who havd retained the traditions
of the language. The practical interpretations of men in different districts would also be relevant. In like manner the learning
of the various kinds of labor prohibited on the Sabbath resolves
itself into what is melh'khah (labor) and the 'bhth mela'khdh
(principal divisions of labor) of the society in which the law was
declared or in which it grew4 up are proper subjects for the con2
sideration of the glossator.
A. The Biblical Cycle.
Just how long the interpretation of Biblical law was bona
of what passages originally meant and nothing
explanation
fide
more, it is hard to say. Tradition tells us that Moses himself
began the process of expounding, 25 and Joshua is supposed to
have continued it as his faithful disciple. 26 I have already suggested an explanation in the light of comparative jurisprudence
of Jewish tradition's famous account of itself. It is significant
that from a host of possible claimants, including king's and
priests, it recognizes as its true bearers only men who characterize the normal stages of legal development.
"The sacredness attributed to the Bible prevented Jewish law from being
anything but glossatorial for a long time. Indeed the glossatorial form runs'
through Hebrew legal literature for many ages; thus the halakzic Midhrashim
interpret Biblical law, the Gemara interprets the Mishnah. But if this glossatorial form reveals the beginning of Jewish legal science, even if it points
out a predominant feature in it, it must not be taken as an indication that
Jewish legal learning remained glossatorial in spirit through all these ages.
Indeed one of the logical weaknesses of Jewish jurisprudence from a modem
point of view is the very practice that gave it its strength in the past-it is
the attempt to base the new code on the older ones, where the basis of the
new may be independent of the terms of the old, and just as solid. Thus,
"Thou shalt not seathe a kid in its mother's milk," were it repeated ten times
instead of three would not suggest anything like the Jewish practice to the
modern jurist. Undoubtedly the Jewish practice is based on very ancient
tradition. Yet the ancient lawyer who recited that practice, when asked for
an authority, did what a modem lawyer frequently has .to do when he has no
case on all fours with the case at bar: he cited an instance not exactly in
point, but one showing a clear tendency in the same general direction. If
one of his followers thereafter writes the accepted law in the form of an
annotation on the old code, he leaves the impression that the practice is
derived solely from the passage cited, a decidedly puzzling impression. "Queer
proof assumes the guise of queer inference."
2 Dt. 1 5, where the Hebrew bo'er means "to explain"; cf. Josephus,
Contra Apionemn, II. 17.
"6Mishnah, 'Abhothz, I. 1; Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Introduction.
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It is remarkable, moreover, that the tendencies suggested
are borne out by such other evidence as we have of the times
covered. Thus, the pre-prophetic age cannot be dismissed as a
codeless period. It is a period of literalism. Joshua and Jephthah must live up to the letters of their promises, no matter how
repugnant their deeds to the spirit. Even the great Samuel does
not tell us that the spirit is greater than the letter, but on the
contrary: "Hath the Lord as great delight in burnt offeringg
and sacrifices as in obeying the voice of the Lord? Behold, to
obey is better than sacrifice and to hearken than the fat of
rams." 27 This archaic pronouncement might serve as the motto
of a glossatorial school. In the same period fictions are already
rife-for example, the fictitious or symbolic transfer or sale
necessary to bind a bargain in the story of Ruth, and the fiction
by which a tribe is saved from extinction. 2 8 In the days of the
early kings, David's worst enemies cannot be dealt with
by Solomon without a technical charge against them.2 9

Solomorl

is told to act according to his wisdom in this matter, and the
essence of legal tokhndh in his day seems to be to make the
words of the law do more than was originally intended. In no
30
other sense was the famous judgment of Solomon hokhmdh.
The pre-prophetic period is a literalistic period; the prophetic,
one of equity. "What doth the Lord require of thee, but to dQ
justly, and to love mercy, and to walkhumbly with thy God?" 3"
Isaiah's ideal ruler "shall not judge after the sight of his eyes,
neither decide after the hearing of his ears; but with righteousness shall he judge the poor, and decide with equity for the meek
of the land."' 32 The spirit of the prophets is clearly a spirit
which our observation of other systems would place in time after
the growth of formal law, and here is a new factor with which
some of the theorists on the subject will have to cope.
At the end of the prophetic period a catastrophe helped the
21 1 S. 15 22-24.

Ruth 4 7; Jgs. 21 16-23.
K. 2 6, 36-46.
o I K. 3.
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"Mic. 6 8.

Isa. 11 3, 4.
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transition from equity to legislation. The Exile forced the
people into a conscious readjustment of their lives. And it is not
surprising that at the Return a great period of legal reconstructions set in. So many statutes or Takkandth could be traced by
tradition to Ezra and his associates 3 3 that anonymous statutes
were ingeneral popularly attributed to the men of this time. These
were the men who said, "Make a hedge around the Torah."34 And
with Ezra the canonization of the Bible-the authoritative repository of the law-begins. We have a new codification and even
while it is in progress a new period of literalism sets in.
.(To be Continued.)
Nathan Isaacs.
Cincinnati Law School.
' Ten in one place, Babh' Kamin', 82 a.
"A Biblical justification for legislation was found in Dt. 17 9.

